In this paper we analyze two recent axiomatic approaches proposed by Dubois et al. [5] and by Giang and Shenoy [10] for qualita tive decision making where uncertainty is de scribed by possibility theory. Both axiom tizations are inspired by von Neumann and Morgenstern's system of axioms for the case of probability theory. We show that our ap proach naturally unifies two axiomatic sys tems that correspond, respectively, to pes simistic and optimistic decision criteria pro posed by Dubois et al. The simplifying uni fication is achieved by (i) replacing axioms that are supposed to reflect two informational attitudes (uncertainty aversion and uncer tainty attraction) by an axiom that imposes order on set of standard lotteries, and ( ii) us ing a binary utility scale in which each utility level is represented by a pair of numbers.
Introduction
The main goal of this paper is to compare two re cent axiomatic approaches proposed by Dubois et al. [5] and Giang and Shenoy [10] for qualitative decision making where uncertainty is described by possibility theory.
In recent years, there is growing interest in qualitative decision making within the AI community [3, 2] . The aim of the research is to deal with various situations where probability and utility inputs required by the classical decision theory are difficult to assess. It is long recognized that probability theory can not faith fully capture all facets of uncertainty that is pervasive in the world. Among several alternative approaches proposed in AI to deal with uncertainty, belief func tion theory [15, 16] , interval-valued probability [13, 20] and fuzzy possibility theory [21, 6 ] occupy prominent positions. Once uncertainty has been represented, the next step is to determine how it can be used in decision making. For the first two theories where probabilistic semantics are still relevant, a standard solution is to assess (according to some criteria) a probability dis tribution and then apply the classical decision theory. For possibility theory, which apparently has no such strong connection with probability , the technique is of little use. In recent years, efforts have been made to create an axiomatic basis for decision theory tailored for possibility theory. Stylistically, the efforts are in two different but related directions following von Neu mann -Morgenstern and Savage [5, 9] . This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, the proposal by Dubois et al. for a decision theory with possibility theory is reviewed. In section 3, we will present a new system of axioms that has been modi fied from our previous proposal designed for Spohnian epistemic belief theory. We prove a representation the orem for that system. In the section 4, a comparison between two approaches is made. We prove a theorem stating that the two axiomatic systems by Dubois et al. are just special cases of our system. An example that illustrates calculation with different utility func tions is provided. The last section consists of some concluding remarks.
2

Pessimistic and Optimistic Utilities
In this section, we review, with some terminology mod ification, the proposal that has been exposed in a series of papers by Dubois et al. [8, 4, 5] . Assume a set S of possible situations or states. A finite uncertainty scale V is assumed, without loss of generality, to be a set of points in the unit interval [0, 1] such that 0, 1 E V. Order� on Vis defined in a natural way. Uncertainty about which among possible states will occur is cap tured by a possibility distribution that is a mapping 1r : S ---+ V such that max•EB 1r( s) = 1. The possibility of a subset A� S, 1r(A) �£ max•EA 1r(s). A finite set X = { x1, x2, .. . Xn} of consequences or outcomes or prizes is also given. To avoid triviality, X is assumed to have at least two elements (n;:: 2). We also assume the existence of two distinct anchor1 elements in set X. xis the best and .;r is the worst i.e., x � Xi and Xi � .;r Vi where � is a preference relation with the reading "at least as good as". A decision or lottery is a mapping from S -X. That is, decision d delivers outcome d(s) in the case that state s occurs. Notice that each decision d induces a possibility distribution :rr d on the set of consequences in the following sense: To a decision maker, the value of decision d is the same as the value of the induced 7rd· And thanks to the mixture construct, set I1x is rich enough to encode not only a simple decision but also a "compound" de cision. For an intuitive reference, a reader can find a similarity between the concept of possibilistic mixture and that of two-stage lottery or "randomized" deci sions in probabilistic approach. A logical conclusion of the above argument is that an analysis of prefer ence on decisions boils down to the analysis of set IIx of possibility distributions on the set of consequences X. In other words, preference of a decision maker can be analyzed through a preference relation � on Ilx. A preference relation could be characterized by a system of axioms (properties) it must satisfy or it could be modeled by a utility function that maps elements of ITx into some (finite) linearly ordered scale U called the utility scale. sup(U) = 1 and inf(U) = 0 are as sumed. Symbol :::: is used for both numerical and util ity comparison.
Dubois et al. consider two kinds of utility called re spectively pessimistic and optimistic utility and pro pose two axiomatic systems to characterize them.
1 The term is chosen to reflect the role these elements play in the continuity axiom presented later in the section.
Pessimistic Utility
The pessimistic utility concept needs the following in gredients: a function
that determines utility for each outcome such that u(x) = 1 and u ( .;r ) = 0; a function
that is an order reversing involution in U i.e. n(1) = 0, n(O) = 1 and n(u1) ;:: n(u2) whenever u1 � u2; and a function h:V-+U
that is an order preserving mapping from uncertainty scale V onto utility scale U such that h(1) = 1 and h(O) = 0. Given that, a pessimistic qualitative utility function Qu -: Ilx -U is defined as
xEX where nh �r n o h -a composition of n and h. (2, 3, 4, 5) such that 1r � 71"' iff Qu-(7r);:: Qu-(7r').
2 We also use two derivative relations: >-for strict pref erence and "' for indifference.
2.2
Optimistic Utility
The authors also consider another utility that sup posedly captures the optimistic behavior of decision makers. The optimistic qualitative utility function QU+ : IIx ---+ U is defined as follows
The system So of axioms that characterize QU+ is obtained from S p by replacing axioms A2-, A4-by A2+ and A4+ respectively where A2+ (Uncertainty attraction) If 7r ;::: 7r1 then 1r t 7r1• A4+ (Continuity) V1r E IIx , 3.\ E V 1r"" (.\fx, 1/.;£).
They also prove a representation theorem for Qu+ and So which is similar to Theorem 1.
3
Unified Possibilistic Utility
In this section, we will translate the construct of qual itative utility [10} that was originally proposed for Spohn's theory of epistemic belief into the possibility theory framework.
A theory of epistemic belief, originally proposed by Spohn [17, 18] to deal with plain belief, has its roots in Adams's [1] work on the logic of conditionals. Spohn's theory has been studied extensively by Goldszmidt and Pearl [11, 12] under the name "rank-based system" or "qualitative probabilities" or "/'\,-calculus". The ba sic construct of the theory is the concept of disbe lief function 8 : S ----> N such that minsES 8(s) = 0 where N is the set of non-negative integers. For A � S, 8(A) �f minsEA 8(s). For A � S and s E A, the conditional disbelief function fJ(siA) is defined as fJ(siA) �f 8(w) -8(A). Despite some nuances, there is a tight relationship between possibility theory and Spohn's theory through log-transformation that has been pointed out in [7] . Namely, for a disbelief func tion 8, Here are some technical notes. In [10] , we have 6 ax ioms that were inspired by presentation of von Neu mann and Morgernstern's axiom system by Luce and Raiffa [14] . Here, in order to make later comparison more transparent, we will present those axioms in a slightly modified form. In [10] we used the product based mixture in the set of Spohnian lotteries in this paper we will adopt the min-based mixture for possi bilistic lotteries.
We use term standard lottery for a lottery that real izes (with corresponding degrees of certainty) in either the best prize x or the worst�. i.e., (.\fx, p,/�) where A, p, E V and max(,\, p,) = 1. We use B to denote the set of all standard lotteries.
We have the following system of axioms that is denoted by S without subscript.
B1 (Total pre-order) t is reflexive, transitive and complete.
B2 (Qualitative monotonicity) t restricted over B satisfies the following condition. Let suppose a = ( .\fx, p,/�) and a '= (X fx, p,' h) then
We list the axioms of S in the same order as those of Sp. Compared with the system in [10] , we note the following correspondence: B1 (Total pre-order) axiom incorporates Axioms 1 and 5 (order of prizes and tran sitivity), B2 is Axiom 6, B3 is Axiom 3 and B4 is Axiom 4. Reduction of compound lotteries axiom is taken care of by the definition of possibilistic mixture.
We need a lemma.
Lemma 1 Assume t satisfies S (axioms B1 through B4). For each 1r E IIx, there exists one and only one a E B such that 7f ""'a.
Proof:
By definition of possibilistic mixture (1), 1r can be rewritten in the form of a mixture (7r(x1)/x1, 1r(x2)/x2, ... K(xn)/xn). By B4, we have Xi ""' ai for 1 ::; i � n where O'i is a stan dard lottery ai = (,\ifx, p,;f�). By B3, we have 1r""' (n(xi)/ai,7r(x2)/a2, ... 7r(xn)/an) · Again using the definition of mixture, we have (1r(xt)/a1, 1r(x2)/a2, ... 'll' (xn)/an) = (>.. fx, f-t/12) where So 1r ""' (.\fx, p,/;£). By B1 and B2, (,\fx, f-Lh) must be unique.
• Let us consider a utility function QU : IIx -U. If we wish that 1r1 ;:: 1r2 iff QU(7r1) ;::: QU(1r2) holds , from qualitative monotonicity (B2), it is clear that utility <0, 1>+-------., <1, 1> <1, 0> Figure 1 : Binary utility scale Uv.
scale U must be at least rich enough to distinguish every standard lottery. Let us take
In other words, Uv is the set of pair of elements in the uncertainty scale V such that one of them is 1. A linear order ;::: on Uv is defined as, for
We refer to Uv equipped with the order ;::: as the binary utility scale.
We extend 3 operation min in such a way that it is distributive with respect to pairing as follows min( a, <,6, ')'>) �f <min( a, ,6 ), min( a,')' )>
We also extend operation max so that it is associative with respect to pairing max( <a, ,6>, <')', 8>) �r < max( a, f'), max(,6, 6)> (12)
Let us call a function u : X ----> Uv that assigns utility for each prize in X a basic utility assessment. We say that a basic utility assessment is consistent with � if for any pair x, y E X x � y iff u(x) ;::: u(y ) , u(x) =<1 , 0> and u(.a;.) =<0, 1>. Remember that x and .a;. are respectively the best and the worst prizes in X . For a given basic utility assessment u, let us define a utility fu nction QU : IIx --+ Uv as follows
We have the following lemma on standard lotteries
Lemma 2 Suppose a = (>.. jx, ILl±) is a standard lot tery then QU(a) =<A, f.L> . where QU is defined by (13) .
Proof:
( �) Suppose � satisfies axioms B 1 through B4. For 1r1> rr2 E Ilx, let us assume 1ri(x;) = rrli and 1r2(x;) = 1r2; for 1 ::; i ::; n. Suppose 1r1 � 1f2, we will show that QU(1r1);::: QU(rr2).
By B4, for each x; E X we have x; '"" a; for some stan dard lottery a; = (>.;jx, f.L;/.a;.) . Let us select a function u as follows u(x) =<1, 0>, u (.a;.) =<0, 1> and u(x;) =<A;,f.L;> for 1::; i::; n.
By B3, 7!"; (rri1/x1, 1r;2/x2, . .. 7r;n/Xn) (1r;da1, 1f;2/a2 , . . . 1r;nfa.,,) fori = 1, 2. Let us give a name Pi to the right hand sides (i = 1, 2). We will show that P i, which is a possibilistic mixture, is reduced to a standard lottery. By definition of mixture, (15) (16 ) and fo r all other x E X By B1, from n1 � 1r2 we have p1 � P2· By B2, since Pi are standard lotteries, Pl � P2 means either (PI (x) ;::: P2(x) a n d P 1 (�) = P2(�) = 1) or (p1(x) = 1 and P2(x)::; 1) or (18) (PI (x) = p2( x ) = 1 and Pl (.a;.) � P2 (.a;.)). Now, let us consider the pair < Pi (x), Pi (.a;.) > . By equations (15, 16) and definitions (11, 12) , we have
Taking into account equations (19, 14, 13) , we have QU(rr i) =<pi(x), Pi(.a;.)> . And each of conditions (18) implies QU(rrl);::: QU(n2).
(-<=)For a given u: X----> Uv such that u(x) =<1,0> and u(.a;.) =< 0, 1 >, a function QU : Ilx --+ Uv is defined as in (13) . We have to show that order t on IIx induced by QU (1r t 1r1 iff QU(1r) � QU(1r')) satisfies axioms Bl through B4.
Bl is satisfied because the order on Uv is transitive and complete.
Suppose a t a' where a = (>.. jx, J.t/l;.), a ' = (>.. ' jx, J-L1 j !f.) arc two standard lotteries. Because t is induced from QU, we have QU(a) � QU(a'). By lemma 2 we have <).,, J-L> � <A', M'>. By definitions (10) and (8) we infer that t satisfies B2.
Suppose 71'1 ""' 71'2. Because t is induced from QU, we have QU(7rt) = QU(7r2 ) . By definition (13), we will have
This means t induced by QU satisfies B3.
Finally, the existence of basic utility assessment u to gether with lemma 2 guarantee satisfaction of B4.
• 4 Pessimistic, Optimistic or Unified
Utilities
In this section, we will do a comparison of three systems of qualitative utilities presented in previous sections. Since we have a representation theorem for each of them, we can discuss the systems either in terms of axioms or in terms of utility functions Qu-, QU+, and QU.
First of all, note that the adjectives "pessimistic" and "optimistic" used for axiom systems S p, So, per haps, implicitly refer to the opposite direction of ax iom A2-and A2+. If n1 � 1r2 in numerical sense i.e. 1r1 (x; ) � 1r2 (x;) 'ifi, then A2-requires 11'2 t 1T1 while A2+ requires 71'1 t 1r2. A2-and A2+ are called un certainty attitude axioms. The former is "uncertainty aversion" and the latter is "uncertainty attraction" .
But perhaps these names are a source of confusion. First, since axiom systems Sp, So are presented in style of von Neumann and Morgenstern [19] , it is ap propriate to recall similar terms "risk aversion" and "risk attraction." In the linear utility theory, risk aver sion (attraction) refers to the concavity (convexity) of utility function. In other words, risk aversion and risk attraction are properties ascribed to individual util ity functions. They are not a property of the utility theory. Different psychological states may result in dif ferent utility assignment to the same outcome or a dif ferent assessment of uncertainty related to outcomes, but it is hard to conceive that they require different theories as implied by Sp and So. Operationally, the dichotomy of pessimistic and optimistic systems might also lead to difficulty in application. For example, how would a decision maker classify herself as either "opti mistic" or "pessimistic" or what would happen if she was unsure about either options. Moreover, in the writing of the authors for example [8, 6] , it is clear that inequality of the form 1r1 � 1r2 is an informational re lationship. It says that 1r2 is more specific than 1r1. In other words, it says that 7!'2 contains more information than 7!'1 does. So it seems to us, the equation of infor mational relationship with preferential relationship t is not a very sensible idea. Although information has its own value, informational value per se rarely serves as a decision criterion. For example, decision making under uncertainty is mostly guided by von Neumann and Morgenstern's linear utility theory rather than by Shannon's information theory.
Let us consider the following example. We face a choice between two lotteries 11'1 = (1/x, 1/!f.. ) and 1r2 = !f.· In other words, 1r1 is a possibilistic distri bution on X such that 111 (x) = 7rr (lJ = 1, 7rr ( x) = 0 for all other x and 1r2(J;,) = 1, 7r2(x) = 0 for all other x. According to possibility theory [8, 6] , 1r1 describes a situation where we have knowledge to exclude all prizes except x and !f.· Moreover, we are equally sure about occurence of either of the prizes. 7rz describes a complete knowledge situation where all but ;£ are ex cluded. Because something is going to happen, 7rz is equivalent to saying that !f. is the certain prize. Ax iom A2-will force us to consider4 1f2 is at least as good as 71'1. In other words, if we were adopting S p we would have been indifferent between a surely worst prize and an uncertain outcome in which there is a hope to get the best prize. We believe such a choice is unreasonable. To see when axiom A2+ recommends a bad action, we could consider a choice between a surely best prize and uncertain outcome where there is a danger of getting the worst prize. A2+ will rec ommend the latter. Note that all these anomalies are corrected by axiom B2.
Let us consider sets of standard lotteries B = {(..\j x , J.t/;£)1 ..\, J.t E V an d max(>.. , fj) = 1}, B-� {(1/'X,J-L/!f.. )l J-i E V} and B+ �f { ().jx, 1/!f.. )\). E V}.
We have B =B-UB+ and B-n B+ = (1/'X, 1/!f.). It is straightforward to verify the following lemma Proof: We will prove (20) . The proof of (21) is just dually similar. Using equation (6), we have
By definition of function nh (eqs.
So, max(nh(l), Qu-(tr2)) = Qu-(tr2). Be cause of lemma condition Qu-(tri) ;::: Qu-(1r2), max(nh(>.), QU-(111)) ;::: QU-('rr2). By equation (22), we have Qu-((A/tri, l/1r2)) = QU-(1r2) .
• Thus, if a decision maker is pessimistic, whenever she sees that the less desirable prize of a lottery is fully possible she will ignore all considerations about other prizes and uncertainty to conclude that the lottery is as good as the least desirable prize. For a optimistic decision maker, once she sees the more desirable prize of a lottery is fully possible she concludes that the lottery is worth the same as that best prize. Roughly speaking, Qu-( QU+) lumps together a half of total number of lotteries.
It has been noted that Qu-and QU+ are "comple mentary" in a sense that although optimistic QU+ is not able to distinguish two lotteries (1/x, fJ.I/�) and ( 1/x, 1-Ld :Jd.), pessimistic Qu-can discriminate between them by comparing values of f.Ll and !-L2.
The situation is reversed for lotteries (>.1/x, 1h) and (>.2/"x, 1/:Jd.). Again, we note that QU agrees with QU in the former situation and with the QU+ in the latter situation.
With notations B-and B+, axioms A4-and A4+ can be restated respectively as Vtr E llx, 3cr E B-1r "' cr and Vtr E llx,3cr E B+ 1r"' cr. We'll show that these axioms can be weakened, without any effect to the results, by requiring instead Vx E X. i.e., (B4-) Vx EX , 3a E B-x,... , a.
(B4+) Vx E X, 317 E B+ x,..., 17.
As we argued previously, these axioms are coun terintuitive. A4-requires, for example, the worst prize :Jd. is equivalent to some lottery where the best prize x is fully possible. But the presense of A2-(A2+) makes the stated form of A4-(A4+) neces sary. Had A4-been substituted by B4 Vx E X, 3a E B x rv a, we would still have :!d. ,..., (1/x, 1/:Jd.), be cause (1/x, 1/:ld.) was the mimimal element in B ac cording to A2-. Let assume for some x ' >-:!d. (x' is strictly preferred to :!d. ) x ' ,..., (>.jx, 1/.a;.). Using def inition (5) and the facts that nh(1) = 0, u(x) = 1 and u(:Jd.) = 0, we calculate Qu-((>.jx, 1/J;.. )) = min(max(nh(.\), u(x)), max(nh(l), u(�))) = 0. From that we infer Qu-(x ' ) = 0 = QU-( :Jd. ) . This is in consistent with assumption x' >-:Jd..
We have the following theorem that states precisely the relationship between systems Sp, So and S.
Theorem 3
Bl is the same as A1-and B3 is the same as A3-, we are left to prove that B2 and B4 are also satisfied. From A4-for each 1r E IIx, 3a E B-1r "' cr. Obviously, X � Ilx and B-� B, so B4 is also satisfied (note that symbol X is used for the set of prizes as well as the set of singleton possibility distributions on set of prizes). And finally, we will show 5 that Sp f= B2. Assume that t satisfies Sp. For two standard lotteries cr = (>.jx, 11/:ld.) and 171 = (>.' jx, 11 ' /:Jd.). We want to show . By A4-we can assume >. = >.' = 1. Furthermore, fl > 1-L' would violate A2-.
We have 1-L :5 1-L'· Thus, the right hand side of (23) (a disjunction) is true.
(iii) Note that since B4-I= B4, set of axioms SUB4-is effectively one that is obtained by replacing B4 by B4-. We have to show that if B1, B2, B3 and B4-are satisfied so arc Al-, A2-, A3-and A4-. Again, we do not have to worry about A1-and A3-since they arc identical to B1 and B3.
First, we will show the satisfaction of A4-. From B4-, we can assume X; "' a; for 1 :S i :S n where a; E B-. We will show that \hr E IIx, :Ja E B-1r"" a. 
and for all other x E X p(x) = max min(1r(xi), 0) = 0 (26) Example: Let X= {x1,x2,x3,x4}. x = Xt >-xz > X3 >-x4 = 22· V = {1,.7,.5,0} and U = {1,.5,.3,0}.
Consider 1l'1,1l'z E IIx with Kt(xt) = .7, 1rt(xz) = 1, 1r1(x3) = .5, 1r1(x4) = . 5 and 1rz (xi) = 1, 1r2(xz) = 6 It was raised by a referee.
7 Here are some reasons for that. First, although B4-f= B4 and B4+ f= B4 we have B4 f!= B4-V B4+. In other words, when a basic utility assignment equates elements in X to standard lotteries on both halves of Uv, it violates both A4-and A4 + . In order that < QU-(1r), QU+ (1r) > makes sense, somehow at least one of them must hold. Sec ond, on one hand, the 5et of <QU-(n), QU+ (n)> is a true two-dimensional object i.e., there is no visible dependence between QU-(n) and Qu+ (1r). On the other hand, set Uv iti not because one of the two numerical values in a pair must be 1.
.7, 1r2(x3) = 0, 1rz(x4) = 1. We will compare utility of 1r1 and 1r2 using Qu-and QU.
For definition of QU-, let us assume that function n is given by n(1) = 0, n(.5) = .3, n(.3) = .5, n(O) = 1. A utility assignment u which is consistent with the preference order x1,x2,x3,x4 is given by u(xt) = 1, u (x2) = .5, u(x3) = .3, u(x4) = 0. Note that this utility assignment also means x1 ""' (1/x1, Ojx4), x2 "' (1/xt, .5/x4), X3 "" (1/xt, .7 jx4) and X4 "' (1/xl, 1/x4). Using definition (5) Thus, according to QU-, 1r1 which is equivalent to x2, is strictly prefered to 1r2, which is equivalent to X4.
To define QU, we have Uv = { <0, 1>, <.5, 1>, <.7, 1> , <1, 1>, <1, .7>, <1, .5>, <1, 0> }. Take the following consistent basic utility assessment u(x1) =< 1,0 >, u(x2) =<1,.5>, u(x3) =<1,.7> and u(x4) = < 1, 1 > . Using definition (13) So, according to QU, 1r1 which is equivalent to x2, is strictly prefered to 1r2, which is equivalent to x4.
• Let us consider the forms of functions QU-, QU+ and QU given by equations (5), (7) and (13) respectively. First of all, it is easy to note that QU looks similar to "optimistic" QU+ which, in turn, is quite differ ent from "pessimistic" QU-. The form of QU+ and QU reminds us of the expected utility in probabilistic approach where the expected utility of a probabilistic lottery pis defined as EIJ(p) �f I:xEX p ( x).u(x). Operations max, min have, respectively, counterparts in addition ( +) and multiplication ( .). This similarity leads us to refer to QU also as expected qualitative util ity function. The difference between functions QU+ and QU is that latter makes no use of function h that maps uncertainty scale V onto utility scale U. In addi tion to h, definition of QU-requires an order reversing involution n on U.
But the key distinction between QU on one hand and Qu-, QU+ on the other hand is that the utility scale used for QU is an ordered set Uv of pairs of numbers that are conveniently taken to be in the uncertainty scale V. The utility scale Uv is chosen so that there is a one to one correspondence between Uv and the set of standard lotteries B.
It is well known that probability theory interprets negation operation in a strictly complementary sense i.e., p(A) = 1 -p( -.A). That fact makes it sufficient to represent the occurence likelihood (or belief in Sav age's personalistic view) of an event by one number its probability. Unlike probability theory, possibility theory as well as most non-probabilistic uncertainty formalisms e.g., Demster-Shafer belief function theory [15, 16] or interval valued probabilty [13, 20] describe uncertainty of an event by two numbers. They are possibility and necessity degrees in possibility theory; plausibility and belief in DS theory; upper and lower probabilities in interval-valued probability theory. It is also well known that the heart of decision making un der uncertainty is trading-off between uncertainty and utility. In order to enable the trade-off, utility and uncertainty must be "comparable." Therefore, binary utility is, perhaps, the "right" answer to binary uncer tainty.
Focusing on standard lotteries, we can give the order on binary utility the following intuition. Since stan dard lottery a E B is a possibility distribution on X such that a(x) = ,\, a(1<_) = f.!. and a(x) = 0 for all other x E X, the possibility degree and the necessity degree assigned by a to x are ,\ and 1 -f.!.· Because dif ferent standard lotteries have exactly the same prize, comparison of their utility boils down to comparing how sure the prize will be realized. The highest con fidence level is, of course, represented by necessity de gree 1 that corresponds to ,\ = 1 and f.l = 0. The confidence level is decreasing when necessity decreas ing to 0. That corresponds to f.!. increases to 1. Before necessity degree becomes 0, the possibility is always 1. Once necessity equals 0, the confidence level can drop further with the falling of possibility degree from 1 to 0. The least confidence level is when the possibility degree is 0 i.e. ,\ = 0 and f.l = 1.
Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a system of axioms for decision making with possibility theory. Our ax iomatic system {S) unifies the pessimistic and opti mistic systems of axioms ( S p, So) previously proposed by Dubois et al. The unification is made by ( i) replac ing two informational attitude axioms A2-and A2+ (uncertainty aversion and uncertainty attraction) by the monotonicity axiom B2; ( ii) generalization of con tinuity axioms A4-and A4+ to axiom B4. Our axiom system subsumes both pessimistic and optimistic sys tems in the sense that any conclusion drawn by either Sp or So can also be made by S. But the reverse is not true. Our system can sensibly handle situations where neither S p nor So could. An example is when prizes in X have equivalent standard lotteries in both halves a-and a + of B. Beside the simplifying effect� we argue that our proposal also removes uncertainty attitude from an utility theory to where it belongsindividual utility assessments.
We also prove a representation theorem for the unified system of axioms. Our utility function maps possibilis tic lotteries into an ordered binary utility scale where each utility level is a pair of numbers. The utility function is a composition of max, min operations that have been generalized in a natural way to work with pairs. The composition is similar to the composition of the classic expected utility expression where in place of max is addition and in place of min is multiplica tion. We also provide intuitive argument for the use
